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Abstract. We consider an infinitely-lived duopoly with asymmetric costs
and study the incentives of the firms to collude or compete in supply functions
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makes collusion harder; but it always has a positive effect on the welfares of
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1 Introduction
As we know from the work of Lin (1996a), in an asymmetric duopoly un-
der Bertrand (price) competition tacit collusion is more likely to occur if the
(cost) efficient firm licenses its cost-reducing technology to the inefficient firm
in return for a fixed fee. The reason is that licensing, or thereof the equaliza-
tion of the production costs, could act for the licensor as a self-disciplining
mechanism, increasing the likelihood of its competitor’s retaliation in case
✯The authors have no conflicts of interests to declare. The usual disclaimer applies.
❸Corresponding author. E-mail: isaglam@etu.edu.tr.
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the licensor cheats on the collusive outcome. A similar result was earlier
found by Eswaran (1993) in the context of cross-licensing and by Kesteloot
and Veugelers in the context of R&D cooperation with spillovers, as well as
by Benoit and Krishna (1987) and Davidson and Deneckere (1990) in models
where firms can create excess capacity to prevent deviations from collusive
agreements. However, there are also environments where licensing does not
always enhance collusion. For example, Lin (1996b) shows that licensing
makes tacit collusion harder if the strategies used by the duopolists are re-
stricted to quantities instead of prices. In this paper, we investigate whether
the results of Lin (1996a) or Lin (1996b), linking the likelihood of collusion
to the presence of licensing positively or negatively, remain to hold when the
asymmetric duopolists compete in supply functions, instead of prices as in
Lin (1996a) or quantities as in Lin (1996b).
Supply function competition was introduced by Grossman (1981) and de-
veloped by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to analyze oligopolistic games with
uncertainties. Since then, this new form of competition has been extensively
used to model the strategic games played by generator companies in electric-
ity industries (see, for example, Green and Newbery, 1992; Rudkevich and
Duckworth, 1998; Newbery and Greve, 2017; and Escrihuela-Villar et al.,
2020). A recent literature pioneered by Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012)
studies how collusive agreements arise in industries like electricity generation
that are under supply function competition. Using an infinitely-lived duopoly
with asymmetric production costs, Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) theo-
retically show that an increase in cost differences reduces in such industries
the likelihood of cartel formation and collusion sustainability. A related
study by Saglam (2020) studies the effect of several profit-sharing rules on
the incentives to join a single-period duopolistic cartel that colludes in supply
functions under cost asymmetry and demand uncertainty. The integration
of supply function competition with technology licensing is due to a recent
work of Saglam (2021), who studies the welfare effects of fixed-fee licensing
and royalty licensing in a duopoly where one of the firms has a cost-reducing
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innovation available to be licensed to the inefficient firm.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one that studies
supply function collusion in the presence of technology licensing. Like Ciar-
reta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012), we consider an infinitely-lived duopoly with
asymmetric production costs. We assume an exogenous and additive demand
shock as in Laussel (1992) and Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) and a lin-
ear marginal cost function (or a quadratic cost function) as in Ciarreta and
Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) to ensure that each stage game of the repeated game
has always a unique non-cooperative equilibrium in supply functions. Be-
sides the possibility of licensing, our model differs from that of Ciarreta and
Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) in the sharing of collusive output. While their model
allocates the industry output in a ratio that equalizes the firms’ marginal
costs, we assume that the efficient firm can offer, to the inefficient firm, a
take-it-or-leave-it contract specifying the division of collusive output. Our
model also differs from those of Lin (1996a,b). This difference is not only
in the form of strategies used by the firms when they compete or collude
but also concerning the sustainability of licensing in case collusion breaks
down. Both Lin (1996a) and (1996b) assume that if in any period one of
the firms cheats on the collusive outcome under licensing, then in subsequent
periods the other firm reverts, for punishment, to a non-cooperative equilib-
rium without any licensing, whereas we assume that any deviation from the
collusive outcome does not affect the firms’ prior agreement on licensing. In
our model, the retaliating firm, if it faces any deviant act, (i) reverts to a
non-cooperative equilibrium with licensing if collusion involves licensing and
(ii) reverts to a non-cooperative equilibrium without licensing if collusion
involves no licensing.
Given the above assumptions, we characterize conditions under which
collusion in the absence or presence of licensing can occur as a sustainable
industrial organization and conduct simulations (numerical computations) to
analyze how these conditions and the welfare distribution in the duopolistic
industry are affected by the size of the cost asymmetry, the discount factors of
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the firms, and the presence of licensing. Our simulations show that collusion
both in the absence and presence of technology licensing can be supported
as a subgame-perfect supply-function Nash equilibrium if the firms are suffi-
ciently patient. This finding is in line with the predictions of folk theorems
in infinitely repeated games with discounting (see, for example, Friedman,
1971; and Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Our simulations also show that
licensing makes tacit collusion in supply functions harder like in the work of
Lin (1996b) where the firms’ strategies are fixed quantities, and unlike in the
work of Lin (1996a) where the firms’ strategies are fixed prices. Moreover,
conditional on collusion the presence of licensing always has a positive effect
on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in the duopoly.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
model, Sections 3 and 4 introduce theoretical and numeric (computational)
results respectively, and finally Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider an infinitely-lived duopolistic industry where the two firms pro-
duce a homogeneous product under demand uncertainty in each discrete time
period t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞}. The firms face a stochastic demand curve in period
t, given by
Dt(pt) = αt − pt, (1)
where pt denotes the period-t price of their products and αt denotes an inde-
pendently and idiosyncratically distributed scalar random variable with full
support [0,∞), a constant mean, µ, and a constant variance, σ2.




where qit ≥ 0 is the quantity of output produced by firm i in period t and
cit ≥ 0 is a parameter denoting the marginal cost of a unit output. We
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assume that c1t = c1 for all t and also c2t = c2 for t = 0 with c2 > c1, meaning
that initially firm 1 is cost-efficient and firm 2 is cost-inefficient. However,
we allow for the possibility of technology transfer under which this initial
cost difference can disappear. That is, at the beginning of period 0, firm 1
can license its cost-efficient production technology to firm 2 indefinitely. If
licensing occurs, then c2t = c1 for all t ≥ 0, otherwise c2t = c2 for all t ≥ 0.
The forms of the demand and cost functions, the parameters µ and σ2 as
well as the parameters c1t and c2t for all t are common knowledge. The only
uncertainty in the industry is about the realization of αt, which is unknown
to any firm until the end of period t.
The firms can either compete or collude in supply functions. Let Sit(.)
denote the supply function of firm i in period t such that Sit(pt) = sitpt, where
sit ≥ 0. We assume that in the pre-production stage of period t, the firms
cooperatively or non-cooperatively select their supply functions. Without
knowing the realization of the demand variable αt, the firms can calculate,
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At this price, the output and profit of firm i in period t would become
q∗it = Sit(p
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respectively. Given equation (6) and the commonly known moments of the
probability distribution for αt, both firms can calculate the expected profit
of firm i ∈ {1, 2} as











) µ2 + σ2
(1 + sit + sjt)2
(7)
using the fact that σ2 = E[α2t ]− µ2.
3 Theoretical Results
We assume that the firms in the duopoly can either compete or collude in
supply functions with or without technology licensing. This assumption leads
to four distinct market structures, of which we are particularly interested,
as the main topic of this research, in the one where the firms collude in all
periods in supply functions with technology licensing. The conditions under
which we observe this particular market structure will depend on the size of
the expected (discounted) lifetime profit streams of the duopolistic firms in
comparison to what they would get under alternative forms of equilibrium
and disequilibrium structures. To calculate these profits and make the re-
quired welfare comparisons, we will first calculate the single-period profits in
each market structure we have mentioned above.
3.1 Supply Function Competition in Period t
We will first analyze a stage game where the two firms engage in supply func-
tion competition as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989). So, consider period t
where the cost parameters of the firms are c1t and c2t. Suppose that each firm
i selects for this period a supply function, or more specifically the slope pa-
rameter sit of such a function, to maximize its expected profit E[πit(sit, sjt)]
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given its conjecture about the choice sjt made by firm j 6= i. When the con-
jecture of each firm is consistent with the choice of its opponent, the choices
of the two firms are said to form a supply-function Nash equilibrium (SFNE).
Formally, a pair of supply functions, 〈SN1t (p∗t ), SN2t (p∗t )〉 with SN1t (p∗t ) = sN1tp∗t
and SN2t (p
∗










for each i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j.
Proposition 1. A period-t game where the firms compete in supply func-
tions has a unique SFNE involving SN1t (p
∗











t such that for each i = 1, 2
sNi (c1t, c2t) =
βt − c1tc2t − 2cit





(c1t + 2)(c2t + 2)(c1tc2t + 2c1t + 2c2t). (10)
Proof. Differentiating E[πit(sit, sjt)] with respect to sit and equating to
zero, we obtain
0 = −(µ
2 + σ2)(citsitsjt + citsit + sit − sjt − 1)
(sit + sjt + 1)3
, (11)
implying the best-response function for firm i given by
sBit(sjt) =
sjt + 1
citsjt + cit + 1
. (12)
Since the two firms’ problems only differ in their cost parameters c1t and c2t,
we can directly write the best-response function of firm j as
sBjt(sit) =
sit + 1
cjtsit + cjt + 1
. (13)
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If the supply functions SN1t (p
∗
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1t). These conditions imply
that we should solve (12) and (13) together, yielding
(cit + citcjt + cjt)(s
N
it )
2 + (2cit + citcjt)s
N
it − (cjt + 2) = 0, (14)
which has the unique solution sNit = s
N
i (c1t, c2t) satisfying (9) and (10). 
We should note that the equilibrium of a non-cooperative stage game
without technology licensing was already characterized by Ciarreta and Guti-
érrez-Hita (2012). However, we cannot directly borrow their result because
their industry structure is, in some aspects, slightly more restrictive than
ours. For example, they assume for mathematical simplicity a ‘symmetric’
version of cost asymmetry by setting c1 = 1−c and c2 = 1+c where c ∈ (0, 1)
and a simpler version of demand shock where the random variable αt can take
values α+µ and α−µ with equal probability for some values of µ. One can
easily check that under these restrictions, Proposition 1 boils down to the
earlier result of Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012).
Given the equilibrium supply functions satisfying (9)-(10), the market-






t , of firm i
become
pNt (c1t, c2t) =
αt
β
(c1t + c2t + c1tc2t) (15)
and
qNit (c1t, c2t) =
αt
2βt
(βt − 2cit − c1tc2t), (16)
leading to the equilibrium industry output
QNt (c1t, c2t) =
αt
βt
(βt − c1t − c2t − c1tc2t). (17)
For convenience, we shall introduce the following notation. For any vari-
able X that is a function of sN1 (c1t, c2t) and s
N
2 (c1t, c2t), let X(c1t, c2t) ≡
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X(sN1 (c1t, c2t), s
N
2 (c1t, c2t)). Using our findings above, we can now calculate
the expected period-t profit of firm i in the supply function equilibrium as
E[πNi (c1t, c2t)] =
µ2 + σ2
2β2t




(βt − 2cit − c1tc2t)
cit(βt − 2cit − c1tc2t)
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, (18)
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(Note that we have been able to get rid of the subscript t in the profit equa-
tions above since the only dependence on time is caused by the arguments
c1t and c2t.) Also, we can calculate in period t the expected consumer sur-
plus, E[CSN(c1t, c2t)], and the expected social welfare, E[SW
N(c1t, c2t)] ≡
E[ΠN(c1t, c2t)] + E[CS
N



























(c1t + 2)(c2t + 2)√




3.2 Supply Function Collusion in Period t
Now, we will consider a stage game where the two firms collude in supply
functions. Again, consider period t where the cost parameters of the firms
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are c1t and c2t. We assume that the two firms can collude if they can agree
on a plan specifying the division of the collusive supply, between themselves,
at any possible price. Let the shares of the firm 1 and firm 2 in such a plan
be denoted by r1t and r2t with r1t + r2t = 1. Let St(pt) = stpt denote the
industry supply function which is the sum of individual supply curves of the
colluding firms, i.e., St(pt) ≡ S1t(pt) + S2t(pt) for each pt ≥ 0. Given the
market-share parameters r1t and r2t, the supply functions of the two firms
can be written as S1t(p) = r1tSt(p) = r1tstpt and S2t(p) = r2tSt(p) = r2tstpt.
Equating the industry demand and supply curves, the market-clearing






Given (22) and the supply functions S1t(pt) and S2t(pt), the profit obtained













The cartel consisting of the colluding firms chooses the industry supply func-
tion St = stpt to maximize the expected industry profits E[π1t(st) + π2t(st)].
Formally, an industry supply function SCt (p
∗




















Proposition 2. If firm 1 and firm 2 engage, in period t, to collude
in supply functions, then they should select the industry supply function as
SCt (p
∗




sC(c1t, c2t, r1t) =
1
c1tr21t + c2t(1− r1t)2 + 1
. (25)
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Proof. The first-order necessary condition associated with the above max-
imization implies
0 = −(µ
2 + σ2)(sCt (c1tr
2




which has the unique solution given by (25). 
We should note that the result in Proposition 2 is entirely different from
the respective result in Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) for stage-game
collusion. The difference mainly stems from the fact that they allocate the
industry output in a ratio that equalizes the firms’ marginal costs, whereas
we assume that the efficient firm can offer, to the inefficient firm, a take-
it-or-leave-it contract specifying, using the pair of parameters (r1t, r2t), the
division of collusive output at each possible price.
Using Proposition 2, we can calculate the market-clearing price and the
equilibrium industry output as
pCt (c1t, c2t, r1t) = αt
c1tr
2
1t + c2t(1− r1t)2 + 1
c1tr21t + c2t(1− r1t)2 + 2
(27)
and
QCt (c1t, c2t, r1t) = αt
1
c1tr21t + c2t(1− r1t)2 + 2
(28)
respectively. Noting that the output of firms 1 and 2 are qC1t = r1tQ
C
t and
qC2t = (1−r1t)QCt respectively, we can calculate their expected period-t profits
under collusion as







c1tr1t(2r1t − 1) + 2(c2t(1− r1t)2 + 1)
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(c1tr21t + c2t(1− r1t)2 + 2)
. (31)
We can also calculate in period t the expected consumer surplus
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2
(32)
and the expected social welfare, E[SWC(c1t, c2t, r1t)] ≡ E[ΠC(c1t, c2t, r1t)] +
E[CSC(c1t, c2t, r1t)], given by







1t + c2t(1− r1t)2 + 3
(c1tr21t + c2t(1− r1t)2 + 2)
2
. (33)
Now, we are ready to consider the infinitely repeated games.
3.3 Infinitely Repeated Games of Competition and Col-
lusion
Using the stage games examined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we will now study
infinitely repeated games where the duopolistic firms have to decide whether
to compete or collude in supply functions in an infinite horizon and also
whether to make a licensing agreement for technology transfer. We assume
that the firms discount future payoffs. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the common
discount factor for the firms. Because of discounting, the firms, to avoid any
potential welfare loss due to delayed decisions, will prepare their infinite-
horizon plans right at the beginning of period 0, taking into account the
expected value of their discounted lifetime profits. Here, we assume that
licensing agreements are in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it contract offered
by the efficient firm (the licensor) to the inefficient firm (the licensee), which
designates a fixed fee the licensee must pay to the licensor to use its cost-
reducing technology.
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Given the above assumptions, the firms have the following four alterna-
tive strategy plans at the beginning of period zero.
Plan 1. In each period, engage in supply-function competition without
technology transfer.
Plan 1 is a subgame-perfect supply-function Nash equilibrium (hereafter
an SPNE), since this plan induces a Nash equilibrium in every period as
we already know from Proposition 1. When firms 1 and 2 follow Plan
1, their cost parameters respectively become c1 and c2 in all periods, and
their expected discounted lifetime profits become E[πN1 (c1, c2)]/(1 − δ) and
E[πN2 (c1, c2)]/(1− δ).
Plan 2. In each period, engage in supply-function competition with tech-
nology transfer under the contract that requires firm 2 to pay, in the first
period this plan comes into effect, a fixed-fee F to firm 1.
If firms 1 and 2 follow Plan 2, their cost parameters become the same
and equal to c1 after they sign the licensing contract; and their expected dis-
counted lifetime profits become E[πN1 (c1, c1)]/(1−δ)+F and E[πN2 (c1, c1)]/(1−
δ)−F . For Plan 2 to be an SPNE, competing under licensing must be bilat-
erally more beneficial for the two firms, in comparison to competing under
no licensing which is prescribed by Plan 1. Thus, Plan 2 can arise as an












for each i ∈ {1, 2}. If the incentive conditions of the two firms in (34) are
satisfied at multiple values of F , then firm 1 should always pick, among them,
the one with the highest value. We will denote this particular value by F̂ .
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Plan 3. In each period, (i) engage in supply function collusion without
technology licensing under the contract that firm 1 will produce the frac-
tion rNL1 of the total supply at any possible price (where the superscript NL
stands for ‘no licensing’), and (ii) threaten to retaliate to any non-collusive
action in any period by reverting to Plan 1 from the next period onwards.
The punishment strategy in Plan 3, known as grim trigger strategy, was
first introduced by Friedman (1971), and also used by Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-
Hita (2012) in characterizing supply function collusion without technology
licensing. If both firms follow Plan 3, then the cost parameters of firm 1
and firm 2 will be c1 and c2 in all periods; moreover, if no deviation ever
occurs, then the expected discounted lifetime profit of firms 1 and 2 will be
E[πC1 (c1, c2, r
NL
1 )]/(1− δ) and E[πC2 (c1, c2, rNL1 )]/(1− δ), respectively.
For Plan 3 to be an SPNE, neither firm 1 nor firm 2 should have any
incentive to deviate from this plan in any period. Let us characterize when
this condition holds. Suppose that in period t firm i ∈ {1, 2} deviates from
Plan 3 while j ∈ {1, 2}\{i} sticks to it. As Plan 3 involves no licensing (NL),
we know that firm j should select the slope of its collusive supply function
as sC,NLj ≡ sCj (c1, c2, rNL1 ). Also, the proof of Proposition 1 implies that the
best-response of firm i to the collusive supply function of firm j must be a









j + ci+1). Given this deviation, the market-









t in accordance with its supply
function. Consequently, firm i could enjoy in period t an expected profit
given by

















Thus, we can calculate the expected period-t profit gain of firm i from
deviating from Plan 3 as E
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ever, Plan 3 requires, after the deviation in period t was observed, the
firms to supply their outputs in accordance with Plan 1 starting from pe-
riod t + 1 onwards. This would yield to firm i an expected continuation
profit of amount δE[πNi (c1, c2)]/(1− δ), when discounted to period t. Thus,













/(1 − δ). Taking into consideration
the expected period-t profit gain and the expected (discounted) future profit
loss of firm i, we can observe that firm i would have no (strict) incentive to



























So far, we have established that Plan 3 can be an equilibrium plan only if
there exists some rNL1 ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies the incentive condition in equation
(36) for each i. However, we should also notice that if the incentive conditions
of the two firms are satisfied at multiple values of rNL1 , then firm 1 should al-







We will denote this particular value by r̂NL1 .
Plan 4. In each period, (i) engage in supply function collusion with tech-
nology licensing under the contract that firm 1 will produce the fraction rL1
of the total supply at any possible price (where the superscript L stands for
‘licensing’), and (ii) threaten to retaliate to any non-collusive action in any
period by reverting to Plan 2 from the next period onwards.
Plan 4 also uses the grim trigger strategy of Friedman (1971), taking into
account the possibility of licensing too, unlike Plan 3. Here, we should note
that the works of Lin (1996a,b) also use grim trigger strategies to charac-
terize the sustainability of collusion under licensing. But, their punishment
strategies do not respect the firms’ initial agreement on licensing. That is,
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Lin (1996a) and (1996b) assume that if in any period any firm cheats on the
collusive outcome under licensing, then in subsequent periods the punishing
firm reverts to a non-cooperative equilibrium without any licensing. This
implicitly assumes that if the licensee were to cheat on the collusive out-
come, the licensor would be able to legally or practically prevent the licensee
from using the licensed technology in subsequent periods, which one can ar-
gue, however, may not be always possible. Thus, we design our grim trigger
strategies in this paper in such a way that any deviation from the collusive
outcome does not affect the firms’ prior agreement on licensing. Thus, the
retaliating firm facing any deviant act and pulling the trigger (i) reverts to a
non-cooperative equilibrium without licensing (Plan 1) if collusion involves
no licensing (Plan 3), and (ii) reverts to a non-cooperative equilibrium with
licensing (Plan 2) if collusion involves licensing (Plan 4).
Note that if the two firms follow Plan 4, they must sign not only the
contract for sharing the collusive output under technology transfer (spec-
ifying the value of the market-share parameter rL1 ) but also, as a contin-
gency, the licensing contract (which specifies the value of the fixed fee F )
mentioned in Plan 2. The cost parameters of firms 1 and 2 will be the
same under Plan 4 and equal to c1 in all periods; moreover, if no deviation
ever occurs, the expected discounted lifetime profits of firms 1 and 2 will be
E[πC1 (c1, c1, r
L
1 )]/(1− δ) and E[πC2 (c1, c1, rL1 )]/(1− δ), respectively.
For Plan 4 to be an SPNE, (i) neither firm 1 nor firm 2 should have
any incentive to use any non-collusive supply function in any period and
(ii) licensing must be bilaterally more beneficial for the two firms than no
licensing. Let us first characterize when condition (i) holds. Suppose that
firm i ∈ {1, 2} unilaterally deviates from Plan 4 by using in period t a supply
function different from its collusive function SCti (.). Since firm j 6= i has
not deviated from Plan 4, it should select the slope of its supply function
as sC,Lj ≡ sCj (c1, c1, rL1 ). Then, we know by the proof of Proposition 1 that
the best-response of firm i to the collusive supply function of firm j must








j +c1+1). Given this deviation, the market-clearing price in









t in accordance with its supply function. Consequently, firm
i could enjoy in period t an expected profit given by





















Thus, we can calculate the expected period-t profit gain of firm i from de-
viating from Plan 4 as E
[













Plan 4 requires, after the deviation in period t was observed, the firms
to supply their outputs in accordance with Plan 2 starting from period
t + 1 onwards. Hence, Plan 4 can be an SPNE only if Plan 2, when-
ever it is played under Plan 4, is an equilibrium of the continuation game
following the deviation of firm i. This implies that the fixed fee F in
Plan 2 must satisfy the incentive conditions in (34) for the two firms. If
these conditions hold, firm i obtains an expected continuation profit of size
δE[πNi (c1, c1)]/(1 − δ) + (−1)i+1F , when discounted to period t. Thus,













/(1− δ)− (−1)i+1F . Taking into con-
sideration the expected period-t profit gain and the expected (discounted)
future profit loss of firm i from deviation, we can observe that firm i would
have no (strict) incentive to unilaterally deviate from using the collusive
supply function SCit (.) only if the fixed F in Plan 2 satisfies the incentive



































So far, we have established that Plan 4 can be an equilibrium plan only if
there exists some rL1 ∈ [0, 1] and F ≥ 0 that satisfy the incentive conditions
in (34) and (38). Now, let us consider our second equilibrium condition,
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which requires that given the market sharing rule implied by rL1 , licensing
(and producing under the same costs) must be bilaterally more beneficial
for the two firms than no licensing (and producing under different costs).


















for each i ∈ {1, 2}. We should be cautious that the above condition does not
require that Plan 4 should be superior to Plan 3 for the two firms, as these two
plans involve, in general, different contracts to share the market supply. The
left-hand side of (39) is the expected profit of firm i under Plan 4 involving
the supply-sharing contract associated with rL1 , whereas the right-hand side
of (39) merely denotes the expected profit obtained by firm i under Plan 3
if it were to face the same contract (associated with the parameter rL1 ) as in
Plan 4. We know that Plan 3, whenever arises as an SPNE, involves the use
of a supply sharing contract associated with r̂NL1 , which is not necessarily
equal to any arbitrary rL1 , nor to the optimal value of r
L
1 from the viewpoint
of firm 1. Thus, the right-hand side of (39) is in general different from the
expected profit obtained by firm i under Plan 3.
Combining all of our findings, we conclude that Plan 4 can be an equilib-
rium plan if and only if there exists some rL1 ∈ [0, 1] and F ≥ 0 that satisfy
the incentive conditions in (34), (38), and (39) for both i = 1 and i = 2.
If these conditions are satisfied at multiple (rL1 , F ) pairs, then firm 1 should
always pick, among them, the pair that yields, for itself, the highest expected
profit at all contingencies. We will denote this particular pair by (r̂L1 , F̂
L).
In the next section, we will show that some of the strategy plans we
have described above start or stop to become an SPNE as the parameters
of our model are varied over their domains. As we are unable to make this
analysis analytically due to the mathematical complexity of some equilibria
plans involving multiple inequalities in many variables and parameters, we
will make numerical computations.
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4 Computational Results
We have performed all numerical computations in this paper with the help of
MATLAB, Release 2021a. The source code of the computation program and
the resulting data are available from the corresponding author upon request.
For all computations, we have set the initial cost parameter c2 of firm
2 at 1, and varied the cost parameter c1 of firm 1 as well as the common
discount factor δ in the interval [0, 1) with increments of 0.01. Also, for all
computations, we have set µ = 3 and σ = 1. Recall that in each of Plans
1-4, the profits of the firms depend linearly on µ2 and σ2; thus, we know
theoretically that an increase in any of these two parameters would only
increase the profits of the firms (as well as the consumer surplus). Therefore,
we have kept µ2 and σ2 unchanged in our computations. Given the described
setting for our model parameters, we have considered 104 distinct pairs of
(δ, c1) values for each analysis of interest.
As we already know theoretically, supply function competition without
licensing (by Plan 1) can always be supported as an SPNE. Below, we in-
vestigate whether/when any of the other three plans we described in Section
3.3 can arise as an SPNE. Our simulations illustrated in Figure 1 suggest the
following findings.
Result 1. Supply function competition without licensing can always be
supported (by Plan 1) as an SPNE, as we already know theoretically. On
the other hand, (i) supply function competition with licensing can be sup-
ported (by Plan 2) as an SPNE at any δ only if c1 is sufficiently high; (ii)
supply function collusion without licensing can be supported (by Plan 3) as
an SPNE at any c1 only if δ is sufficiently high; (ii) supply function collusion
with licensing can be supported (by Plan 4) as an SPNE if both c1 are δ are
sufficiently high.
Result 1 reveals that firm 1 benefits from licensing under supply function
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competition, according to Plan 2, if and only if its cost advantage, 1 − c1,
is sufficiently small, which occurs when c1 ≥ 0.84. On the other hand, a
collusion plan with or without licensing can be an equilibrium only if the
discount factor of the firms is sufficiently high. In particular, collusion with-
out licensing (according to Plan 3) can be an SPNE at any simulation level
of c1 if and only if δ is sufficiently high (approximately not less than 0.43),
whereas collusion with licensing (according to Plan 4) can be an SPNE if and
only if the cost advantage, 1 − c1, of firm 1 is sufficiently small (not higher
than 0.16) and δ is sufficiently high (approximately not less than 0.54).
Figure 1. The Set of (c1, δ) Pairs Supporting Equilibrium Plans









































We can compare our findings reported above to those of Ciarreta and
Gutiérrez-Hita (2012), who show that in the absence of licensing collusion
becomes sustainable if the cost asymmetry is sufficiently small and the dis-
count factors of the firms are sufficiently high. We find a similar result only
in the presence of licensing (according to Plan 4), which was not studied by
Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012). In the absence of licensing, our results
are partially different. As in Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012), we find
that collusion becomes sustainable (according to Plan 3) only if the discount
factors of the firms are sufficiently high. But, unlike their findings, we do not
need the cost asymmetry (the difference c2 − c1 = 1 − c1 in our model) to
be sufficiently small. Comparing our results for Plan 3 and Plan 4, we also
observe that technology licensing makes tacit collusion in supply functions
harder like in the work of Lin (1996b) where the firms’ strategies are fixed
quantities, and unlike in the work of Lin (1996a) where the firms’ strategies
are fixed prices. We should recall that the cooperative equilibrium in Plan
4 (collusion with licensing) requires the firms to play the non-cooperative
equilibrium strategies according to Plan 2 (competition with licensing) in
case one of the firms cheats on the collusive outcome. Therefore, Plan 4
may arise as an SPNE only if the parameters supporting Plan 4 can also
support Plan 2. On the other hand, the cooperative equilibrium in Plan 3
(collusion without licensing) requires the firms to play the non-cooperative
equilibrium strategies according to Plan 1 (competition without licensing)
in case one of the firms cheats on the collusive outcome. Thus, Plan 3 may
arise as an SPNE only if the parameters supporting Plan 3 can also support
Plan 1. But, we know that Plan 1 is supported by all cost parameters and
therefore it has no bite for Plan 3, whereas Plan 2 can be supported by a
thin set of cost parameters (requiring c1 to be not less than 0.84) rendering
Plan 4 less likely than Plan 3 to arise as an equilibrium. One can observe
from Figure 1 that the set of (c1, δ) parameters supporting Plan 4 is nearly
the intersection of the set of parameters supporting Plan 3 and the set of
parameters supporting Plan 2.
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Our next goal is to examine how our model variables, the product price,
the output of firms, and the welfare distribution change when c1 is varied.
To this aim, we will compute for any model variable X a total of 104 sim-
ulated values, denoted by X(c1, δ), by varying both c1 and δ inside the set
{0.00, 0.01, . . . , 0.99}. Next, we will report for each c1 the average value of
X, denoted by X̄(c1) =
∑
0.99
δ=0.00 X(c1, δ)/100. Following this procedure, we
first calculate for each equilibrium plan the expected product price, as illus-
trated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The Price of the Product Under Alternative Equilibrium Plans




Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4
Our findings in Figure 2 are summarized as follows.
Result 2. The product price is always increasing in c1 and always higher
under collusion than under competition. Moreover, licensing has always a
negative effect on the product price both under competition and collusion.
Because the industry demand curve is always negatively sloped, Result 2
implies that the industry output is always decreasing in c1 and it is always
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lower under collusion than under competition. Moreover, licensing always
increases the industry output under both competition and collusion. Our
simulations illustrated in Figure 3 investigate whether these findings can
also be observed for the output of each firm.
Figure 3. The Outputs of the Firms Under Alternative Equilibrium Plans
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(ii) Output of Firm 2
Figure 3 shows that both the presence of licensing and changes in the cost
parameter of firm 1 affect the outputs of the two firms in opposite directions.
Result 3. The output of firm 1 is always decreasing in c1 regardless of the
presence of licensing, whereas the output of firm 2 is always increasing in c1 if
there is no licensing (Plans 1 and 3). If there is licensing, the output of firm
2 is decreasing in c1 if the firms compete (Plan 2) and slightly fluctuating in
c1 if the firms collude (Plan 4). Besides, the output of both firms are always
lower when they collude (Plans 3 and 4) than when they compete (Plans 1
and 2). Moreover, licensing has always a negative effect on the output of
firm 1 and a positive effect on the output of firm 2 both under competition
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and collusion.
In Figure 4, we consider the effects of cost changes and the presence of
licensing on the welfare distribution.
Figure 4. The Profits of the Firms Under Alternative Equilibrium Plans





(i) Profit of Firm 1
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(ii) Profit of Firm 2









Result 4. The profit of firm 1 is almost always decreasing in c1 whereas the
profit of firm 2 is almost always increasing in c1 except under Plan 4 where it
is slightly fluctuating. Besides, the profit of each firm is always higher under
collusion than under competition and licensing has negligible effects on the
profits of the two firms under competition. We also find that the consumer
surplus is always decreasing in c1 under competition and slightly increasing
under collusion. Moreover, licensing has always a positive effect on the con-
sumer surplus.
Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) show that the efficient firm always
benefits from supply function collusion whereas the inefficient firm benefits
from it only if the cost asymmetry is sufficiently small. Figure 4 shows that
in our model even the inefficient firm always benefits from collusion irre-
spective of the presence of licensing. The difference between our result and
that of Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012) is caused by the difference in our
assumptions as to the division of collusive output. Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-
Hita (2012) assume that the collusive output is allocated between the firms
in a ratio that equalizes their marginal costs whereas we assume that the
efficient firm can offer to the inefficient firm any individually rational (ad-
missible) contract specifying the division of the collusive output. It seems
that the contract proposed by the efficient firm to maximize its self-interest
not only prevents the two firms from cheating on the collusive outcome but
also ensures that they both have an incentive to join a collusive agreement
regardless of whether licensing occurs or not.
Comparing the findings for Plan 3 and Plan 4 in Figure 4, we also observe
that firm 2 always prefers Plan 4 (collusion with licensing) to Plan 3 (collusion
without licensing), while the same is true for firm 1 only for a thin range of
the cost parameter c1 (requiring it to lie between 0.84 and 0.89). On the
other hand, for consumers Plan 4 is always preferred to Plan 3. Therefore,
collusion with licensing is Pareto superior to collusion without licensing if c1
is in {0.84, . . . , 0.89}.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered an infinitely-lived duopoly with asymmetric
costs and studied the incentives of the firms to collude in supply functions
under the possibility of technology licensing. We have shown that licens-
ing makes tacit collusion in supply functions harder like in the work of Lin
(1996b) where the firms’ strategies are fixed quantities, and unlike in the
work of Lin (1996a) where the firms’ strategies are fixed prices. We have
also found that conditional on collusion, the presence of licensing always has
a positive effect on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in
the duopoly, whereas it may have a positive effect on the welfare of the more
efficient firm only for a thin range of cost parameters.
Our welfare results hinge on several assumptions in our model. For exam-
ple, we have assumed that all contracts are made by the more efficient firm
in the duopoly. As for the licensing contract, we have also assumed that side
payments are possible, allowing the licensee to pay a fixed fee to the licensor
to use its cost-reducing innovation. Besides, we have enabled the licensor,
the more efficient firm in the duopoly, to choose this fixed fee to maximize its
welfare. One could alternatively consider, of course, licensing contracts that
are determined jointly by the licensor and the licensee using some cooperative
bargaining rule. As for the collusion contracts in our model, side payments
are not required, since these contracts only specify how the firms should share
the industry supply, not the industry profits. However, one could alterna-
tively model the collusion contracts as in Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012),
which divides the supply, according to the proposal of Patinkin (1947), in a
ratio that equalizes the marginal costs of the firms. We should note that the
alternative contracts for licensing and collusion might change the equilibrium
welfares of the firms, possibly in favor of the less efficient firm, both under
competition plans and collusion plans. Moreover, under these contracts the
likelihood of collusion would be smaller than implied by our model. The rea-
son is that even though in our model the more efficient firm has the complete
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power to choose the best licensing and collusion contracts for itself, it makes
these choices under the constraint that both contracts should satisfy the in-
centive constraint of the less efficient firm, as well. This flexibility is lost
when the licensing contract determines the fixed fee according to a predeter-
mined bargaining rule or when the collusion contract divides the output to a
prespecified rule such as the one used in Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2012).
Thus, we can argue that our results on the likelihood of collusion may be an
upper limit that may provide a benchmark to compare the implications of
possible variations of our model.
Given the relevance of supply function competition to power industries,
our results may have some practical implications, as well. Power industries
usually have an oligopolistic structure due to several factors including de-
mand elasticity, the number of potential generators, transmission constraints
and congestion, transmission losses, and entry barriers in the form of capital
investment (David and Wen, 2001; Aliabadi et al., 2016). It is well known
that the lack of perfect competition makes electricity industries susceptible
to explicit or implicit (tacit) collusion. Fabra and Toro (2005), Sweeting
(2007), and Cabacungan et al. (2013) report that in the past power gener-
ators might have been engaged in implicit collusion in electricity markets of
Spain, the UK, and the Philippines, respectively. Implicit collusion cannot
be held unlawful by competition laws, but regulators may nevertheless imple-
ment preventive measures to reduce its likelihood, provided they can detect,
or at least credibly suspect, its existence. Our results show how collusion
in supply functions, both in the presence and absence of technology sharing,
could affect the market-clearing price and the industry output, offering to
regulators some helpful guidance to detect collusion.
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